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Comment
State v. Perry: Louisiana's Cure-to-Kill Scheme
Forces Death-Row Inmates to Choose Between
a Life Sentence of Untreated Insanity and
Execution
Kristen Wenstrup Crosby
A Louisiana court sentenced Michael Owen Perry to death
for murdering his mother and father, as well as three other
family members.' At the suggestion of the Louisiana Supreme
Court,2 the trial court conducted hearings to determine
whether Perry was competent 3 to be executed.4 Although the
1. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 748 (La. 1992). In a single evening Perry
shot and killed his two cousins, his parents, and his two-year-old nephew. Id
He shot each in the head from a short distance. I& Perry was found in a
Washington, D.C. hotel room, where he had collected seven television sets on
which he had drawn pictures of eyes and written each of his victims' names.
Id. at 547. Perry had a history of schizophrenic behavior and was diagnosed as
a paranoid schizophrenic prior to the murders. Id. He was obsessed with
singer Olivia Newton John and had been caught attempting to enter her prop-
erty after sending her several letters. Paul La Rosa, Crazed Fans Stalk Stars,
CALGARY HERALD, Aug. 11, 1991, at El. Perry was convinced she was signal-
ing him with her eyes and that she was responsible for bodies rising from his
floor. Id. He had also threatened to kill Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor. Id. His parents had him judicially committed to a mental institu-
tion from which he escaped. State v. Perry, 502 So. 2d 543, 546 (La. 1986), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 872 (1987). He was living in a trailer behind his parents'
house when he committed the murders. Id.
2. Perry, 502 So. 2d at 547, 564. In affirming Perry's conviction and sen-
tence, the Louisiana Supreme Court asserted that a competency hearing
"might be in order." Id.
3. The court questioned Perry's competence to stand trial due to his bi-
zarre behavior upon arrest and his past mental illness. Id at 547. Experts
found Perry incompetent and diagnosed him as paranoid schizophrenic. Id.
After 18 months of treatment with antipsychotic drugs, he was deemed compe-
tent to stand trial. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 748. Ignoring the advice of his counsel,
Perry declined to plead insanity and instead pled not guilty. Id The jury con-
victed Perry and sentenced him to death. I&
4. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 748. Since his conviction, Perry had become in-
creasingly delusional. He shaved his eyebrows in order to get more oxygen,
insisted he was the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, fed soap to the
toilet because he thought it told him it was hungry, and became aggressive and
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trial court declared Perry incompetent, the court held that the
administration of antipsychotic drugs5 could restore him to
competence. 6 The court ordered the medical staff of the De-
partment of Corrections to maintain Perry on these drugs, for-
cibly if necessary.7 The Louisiana Supreme Court ultimately
reversed this order, holding that the state could not forcibly
medicate a death-row inmate to restore competence for
execution.8
Although the supreme court stayed Perry's death sentence,
mumbled nonsense when he heard Olivia Newton John's name. Adam
Nossiter, Paradox: Healing to Execute, ATLANTA CONST., March 17, 1991, at
Al. The court held a competence hearing pursuant to LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
art. 647 (1992), which required a contradictory hearing to determine compe-
tence when evidence of incompetence was presented. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 748,
777.
5. Antipsychotic medication helps to normalize thought processes im-
paired by mental disease. Thomas G. Gutheil, M.D. & Paul S. Appelbaum,
M.D., 'Mind Contro," "Synthetic Sanity," "Artificial Competence," & Genu-
ine Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects of Antipsychotic Medication, 12 HOF-
STRA L. REv. 77, 79 (1983). The drugs can suppress disordered thinking,
agitation, and hallucinations, allowing for more normal mental functioning.
Id. Antipsychotic drugs have been used in United States since the 1950s. Id
at 99. The drugs revolutionized the treatment of the severely mentally ill.
Since the 1950s, the number of patients in mental institutions has decreased by
hundreds of thousands, due in part to the success of treatment with the drugs.
Id. at 100-01. Antipsychotic drugs merely suppress the symptoms of mental
illness. Id. at 101. They do not cure the disease. Id. Furthermore, these
drugs can cause numerous, often serious, side effects. Id. at 104-17. The most
noted effects of antipsychotics are parkinsonism, which is similar to naturally
incurred Parkinson's disease; dystonia, which results in muscle spasms; dys-
kinesia, which causes involuntary motor movements; and akathisia, which af-
fects the emotional state of the patient so that she has an "inner restlessness"
and can not sit still. Id at 107-09; see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,
229, 230 (1990) (describing effects and side effects of psychotropics). Still,
these side effects are not common and can be prevented if detected early.
Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra, at 116-17.
6. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 747. Judge Hymel of the 19th District Court in
East Baton Rouge held:
It is ordered that the defendant, Michael Owen Perry, is compe-
tent for purposes of execution in that he is aware of the punishment
he is about to suffer and he is aware of the reason that he is to suffer
said punishment.
It is further ordered that the defendant's competency is achieved
through the use of antitropic or antipsychotic drugs including Haldol
and the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections is
further ordered to maintain defendant on the above medication as to
be prescribed by the medical staff of said Department and if necessary
to administer said medication forcibly to defendant and over his
objection.
Perry, 610 So. 2d at 773 (Marcus, J., dissenting) (quoting Judge Hymel's order).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 771.
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its reasoning has dangerous consequences for mentally-ill
death-row inmates. The court faced two critical issues in Perry:
whether the state may forcibly medicate an inmate to restore
competence for execution and whether chemically-induced
competence is sufficient for execution. If the court had deter-
mined that drug-based competence never suffices for execution,
it would have effectively resolved both issues. Instead, the
court ignored the question of sufficiency entirely and addressed
the forcible medication issue only with respect to treatment in-
tended exclusively to restore competence for execution.
As a result, the only inmates the Perry decision protects
from execution are those the state admits it wants to forcibly
medicate solely to allow their execution. The state has full au-
thority to execute those same inmates, however, if it medicates
them forcibly for other purposes or if the inmates voluntarily
accept antipsychotic medication for treating symptoms of in-
sanity. By focusing its analysis on the method of achieving
competence for execution, rather than the actual degree of
competence, the Perry court created a ludicrous situation.
Under Perry, the determinant of an inmate's execution is
whether the state commands medication and, if so, whether it
acknowledges the single purpose for such treatment is to re-
store competence for execution.
The Louisiana Supreme Court was the first court to con-
front the issue of whether chemical competence is sufficient for
execution. No state legislature has resolved the issue: few
have even addressed it. 9 A clear ruling barring the execution
of inmates undergoing treatment involving mind-altering drugs
potentially would benefit the estimated seventy percent 0 of
death-row inmates who suffer from mental illness.A' When
9. See, In re Emergency Amendment to Fla. Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, Rule 3.811, Competency to be Executed, 497 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1986); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 75A(a)(2) (1988); see infra notes 39-40 for further discus-
sion and the text of this legislation.
10. ROBERT JOHNSON, DEATH WoRx: A STUDY OF THE MODERN ExEcu-
TION PROCESS 50 (1990).
11. The popularity of antipsychotic drugs as a treatment for mental illness
ensures that mentally ill inmates will be given the drugs. See Alvord v. State,
322 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923 (1976). Gary Alvord was
convicted of murdering three women and sentenced to death in Florida. Id at
535. Alvord was treated with antipsychotic drugs after his mental capacity de-
teriorated during his ten years on death row. Nancy S. Horton, Comment,
Restoration of Competency for Execution: Furiosus Solo Furore Punitur, 44
Sw. L.J. 1191, 1192 (1990). The court found him incompetent for execution
and stayed his sentence while he was in a mental institution receiving treat-
ment. Id, After the drug treatment he returned to death row. Id Alvord has
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other death-row inmates treated with antipsychotic medication
challenge the adequacy of their chemically-induced compe-
tence, courts across the country will look to Perry for guidance.
The only guidance Perry offers, however, is a warning to men-
tally-ill death-row inmates to refuse medication which may al-
leviate the symptoms of their illness.
This Comment critiques the Louisiana Supreme Court's de-
cision in State v. Perry. Part I describes the United States
Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence as it relates to in-
sanity and antipsychotic medication. Part II examines State v.
Perry, paying particular attention to the Louisiana court's fail-
ure to resolve the questions before it. In Part III, this Com-
ment contends that the Perry decision requires mentally-ill
death-row inmates to choose between insanity and execution.
To resolve this dilemma, this Comment argues that execution
of a death-row inmate should not depend on whether the in-
mate accepts medication voluntarily or is forced to take it. In-
stead, the degree of her competence should be the only
consideration. This Comment urges that chemically-induced
competence is never sufficient for the purpose of execution.
I. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, INSANITY, AND
ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS
A. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND LIMITATIONS ON ITS USE
The death penalty is a traditional form of punishment in
the United States.12 Indeed, the Fifth Amendment anticipates
not yet been executed, NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., Exe-
cution Update, Jan. 5, 1993, and the Florida court has not confronted the issue
of whether he is competent for execution while under the influence of antip-
sychotic drugs, cf. Alvord v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir.) (ap-
pealed conviction and sentencing procedures), cert denied, 469 U.S. 956 (1984);
Alvord v. Dugger, 541 So. 2d 598, 599 (Fla. 1989) (appealed conviction and sen-
tencing procedures), cert denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990); Alvord v. State, 459 So.
2d 316, 317 (Fla. 1984) (per curiam) (challenged constitutionality of Florida's
statutory procedure for determining competence for execution); Alvord v.
State, 396 So. 2d 184, 185 (Fla. 1981) (per curiam) (same); Alvord, 322 So. 2d at
535 (same).
12. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177-78 (1976) ("For nearly two centu-
ries, this Court, repeatedly and often expressly, has recognized that capital
punishment is not invalid Per se."). At present, 36 states allow the death pen-
alty for the crime of murder. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS: 1991, at 703 (1992).
When the Bill of Rights was written, capital punishment was accepted as an
appropriate sentence. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169-70. The First Congress approved




capital punishment by acknowledging the state's power to take
the life of its citizens as long as the state accords them due
process.13
Despite constitutional acknowledgement of the death pen-
alty, the Supreme Court's support for it has varied over time.
The Court has noted that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment must be read with an eye to-
ward "evolving standards of decency"14 and "in the light of con-
temporary human knowledge."15 In the 1976 landmark case of
Gregg v. Georgia,16 however, the Supreme Court determined
that the death penalty did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment for the crime of murder.1 7 A plurality of the
Court' held that because execution serves two purposes in con-
temporary society, deterrence and retribution,'9 it does not vio-
13. The Fifth Amendment reads: "[Nior shall any State deprive any per-
son of life, liberty or property without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
14. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173
(stating that the Eighth Amendment must not be interpreted as static);
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (asserting the cruel and unu-
sual clause "may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a
humane justice").
15. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
16. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the
Supreme Court threw the validity of capital punishment into question when it
declared existing death penalty laws unconstitutional. Id at 313. This deci-
sion effectively vacated 600 death sentences. AmNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE DEATH PENALTY 14 (1987). The Court
based its decision, however, on the arbitrary and capricious manner in which
the death sentences were applied, not upon the Court's determination that
capital punishment itself violated the Constitution. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313.
Still, between 1972 and 1976, the future of the death penalty was uncertain.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra, at 15.
17. Pointing to new death penalty legislation in several states and a 1973
Gallup poll indicating that 59% of the population approved of the death pen-
alty, the Court concluded that "[d]espite the continuing debate, dating back to
the 19th century, over the morality and utility of capital punishment, it is now
evident that a large proportion of American society continues to regard it as
an appropriate and necessary criminal sanction." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179.
18. Justice Powell wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Justices Stewart
and Stevens. Id at 158.
19. Id- at 183. Deterrence is served when, because of the punishment re-
sulting from the crime, potential perpetrators do not commit the crime. As
Justice Stewart conceded, the actual deterrent effect of the death penalty is
debatable, but he argued that legislatures, rather than courts, should be left to
make that assessment. Id- Thus, in the plurality's view, the Court should ac-
cept the Georgia legislature's determination that execution has a deterrent ef-
fect. Id In addition, Justice Stewart explained the retributive value of the
death penalty:
The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channel-
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late the Eighth Amendment.20
There are exceptions, however, to the general rule that the
death penalty is an appropriate punishment for murder. Be-
cause modern courts justify the death penalty based on its de-
terrent and retributive purposes, courts may not impose it
where it will serve neither purpose.21 Furthermore, courts may
not impose the punishment under procedures that pose a risk
of "arbitrary and capricious" application.22
One traditional limit courts have faced when imposing the
death penalty is the ban against executing insane people.23 In
Ford v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court24 decided that, in light
of both common-law tradition25 and the contemporary purposes
of capital punishment,26 executing an insane death-row in-
mate27 would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
ing that instinct in the administration of criminal justice serves an im-
portant purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed by
law. When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling
or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they
"deserve," then there are sown the seeds of anarchy-of self-help, vigi-
lante justice, and lynch law.
I& at 183 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
20. Id at 187. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII.
21. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982) (overruling death sentence
of a co-conspirator defendant who had not participated in the murder).
22. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (declaring unconstitutional a system that had
no standardized procedure for determining who would be selected for the
death penalty).
23. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406-08 (1986). Traditional justifica-
tions for the ban on executing insane people range from lack of spiritual prep-
aration to sheer barbarity. Id No state in the United States has ever
condoned the execution of insane people. Id at 408.
24. Justice Marshall wrote an opinion which Justices Brennan, Blackmun,
and Stevens joined and in which Justice Powell concurred in part and con-
curred in the judgment. See i& at 401, 408.
25. Id- at 406-08.
26. Id- at 409-10. The Ford Court asserted: "For today, no less than
before, we may seriously question the retributive value of executing a person
who has no comprehension of why he has been singled out and stripped of his
fundamental right to life." Id- Furthermore, the Court noted that executing
the insane cannot serve as a deterrent. The Ford Court quoted Sir Edward
Coke to explain: "By the intendment of Law the execution of the offender is
for example .... but so it is not when a mad man is executed, but should be a
miserable spectacle, both against Law, and of extream [sic] inhumanity and
cruelty, and can be no example to others." I& at 407.
27. In Ford, the petitioner was competent to stand trial, but after his con-
viction he gradually lost touch with reality. Id at 402. Examining psychia-
trists determined that he had a mental disease resembling paranoid
schizophrenia with suicide potential. Id. at 402-03. The petitioner became ob-
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tion of the Eighth Amendment.28
B. DETERMINING COMPETENCE FOR EXECUTION
The Ford majority failed to set a standard for determining
insanity in the context of competence for execution.29 Writing
separately, Justice Powell applied the reasoning of the majority
decision30 and concluded that the Eighth Amendment bars the
execution "of those who are unaware of the punishment they
are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it." 31 In inter-
preting Ford's mandate, courts and legislatures have used this
definition as the standard for determining competence for exe-
cution.32 Justice Powell's standard resembles the traditional
sessed with the idea that he was the target of a conspiracy involving the prison
guards, his doctors, and the Ku Klux Klan. Id. at 402. He was convinced that
his family was being held hostage in the prison and that the prison guards had
been hiding bodies in the concrete enclosures used for beds. Id. Eventually,
the petitioner regressed further into his own world, speaking in his own coded
language. Id. at 403. The petitioner was convinced he could not be executed
because he controlled the Governor through mind waves and because he had
won a landmark case prohibiting execution. Id.
28. Id. at 409, 410 (stating that "[w]hether its aim be to protect the con-
demned from fear and pain without comfort of understanding, or to protect
the dignity of society itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless ven-
geance," the Eighth Amendment proscribes execution of the insane).
29. A definition is implied, however, by the majority's rationale: if a
death-row inmate does not understand why he is being executed, the purpose
of retribution is not served and our basic notion of justice is insulted. See id.
at 409-10.
30. Id. at 421 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). Justice Powell relied upon the common-law tradition requiring that a
death-row prisoner have the capacity to prepare spiritually for his death and
the more modern conceptions of retribution and deterrence to arrive at his
definition of competence for execution. Id-
31. Id at 422. Powell argued that his standard should serve as a mini-
mum requirement and acknowledged that states may offer more rigorous stan-
dards. Id, at 422 n.3.
32. See, e.g., Martin v. Dugger, 686 F. Supp. 1523, 1567, 1573 (S.D. Fla.
1988) (meaning of insanity under the Eighth Amendment is the meaning
stated by Justice Powell in Ford, that defendant lacks both a factual and ra-
tional understanding of crime and punishment), aff'd, 891 F.2d 807 (11th Cir.
1989), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 222 (1990); Rector v. Clinton, 823 S.W.2d 829, 831
(Ark. 1992) (per curiam) (noting that the Arkansas standard of competence
for execution is the same as Justice Powell's standard in Ford); State v. Harris,
789 P.2d 60, 64-65 (Wash. 1990) (en banc) (adopting Justice Powell's standard
as the minimal standard required for competence under the Eighth Amend-
ment and adding a requirement that the inmate be able to assist counsel in
defense); see also GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-10-60 to -61 (Michie 1990) (stating that
the convicted person must have an understanding of the death penalty and
why it was imposed on him); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-3 (Smith-
Hurd 1992) (same); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.811-.812 (same).
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standard used to determine competence for trial which requires
that the defendant understand, both factually and rationally,
the proceedings against him and be able to assist counsel in his
defense.33
In Louisiana, the standard for determining competence for
execution derives directly from the standard for competence to
stand trial.4 To stand trial or face execution in Louisiana, a
defendant must understand the relationship between the pun-
ishment and the crime, and she must be able to assist in the de-
fense of her life with an appreciation for the stakes involved.3 5
C. RESTORING COMPETENCE
In the majority of death-penalty states, including Louisi-
ana, an inmate's incompetence merely suspends execution.36
33. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam). The
Court explained that "the test must be whether he has sufficient present abil-
ity to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational... as well
as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Id For application
of the Dusky standard, see Stover v. Hamilton, 604 S.W.2d 934, 939 (Ark. 1980)
(Fogelman, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Watts v. State, 537
So. 2d 699, 699-700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 545 So. 2d 1370 (Fla.
1989); Norris v. State, 295 S.E.2d 321, 324-26 (Ga. 1982); People v. Murphy, 513
N.E.2d 904, 914 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 517 N.E.2d 1092 (Ill. 1987); Dod-
son v. State, 502 N.E.2d 1333, 1338 (Ind. 1987); State v. Jones, 664 P.2d 1216,
1222 (Wash. 1983) (en banc).
34. In State v. Allen, the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the statutory
standard for competence to stand trial as its standard to determine compe-
tence for execution because the court determined that the same reasoning ap-
plies to each standard. See 15 So. 2d 870, 871 (La. 1943). The Louisiana Code
of Criminal Procedure sets forth the competence standard: "Mental incapacity
to proceed exists when, as a result of mental disease or defect, a defendant
presently lacks the capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to
assist in his defense." LA. CODE CRim. PROc. ANN. art. 641 (West 1981).
35. Allen, 15 So. 2d at 871. By requiring the ability to assist counsel, the
Louisiana standard grants greater protection than Justice Powell's standard
against the execution of the insane.
36. Most states merely suspend the execution until competence is
achieved. See ALA. CODE § 15-16-23 (1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4024
(1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-506 (Michie 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3704-
3704.5 (West Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-114 (1986); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 54-101 (1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 406 (1992); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-10-71 (Michie 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-3 (Smith-Hurd
1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.240 (Baldwin Supp. 1992); MiSs. CODE ANN.
§ 99-19-57 (Supp. 1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.060 (Vernon Supp. 1992); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-19-202 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2537 (1989); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 176.455 (Michie 1992); N.M STAT. ANN. § 31-14-7 (Michie 1984);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1001 to -1007 (1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2949.28
(Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1008 (West 1986); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-24 (1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-180 (Michie 1990); WYO.
STAT. § 7-13-902(f) (1987). In Florida and Louisiana, once competence is re-
[Vol. 77:11931200
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Thus, once a prisoner regains competence, the state may re-
sume execution proceedings.3 7
The Ford Court did not delineate when or how a prisoner
regains competence or whether competence dependent on med-
ication suffices for execution. The Louisiana court was the first
to confront the chemical competence issue.38 Although only a
few state legislatures have addressed the issue,39 at least one
has determined that chemical competence suffices for the pur-
pose of execution.40
Courts have addressed the adequacy of chemical compe-
tence in the analogous context of capacity to stand trial. State
courts disagree as to when chemical competence is sufficient to
proceed to trial.41 The Supreme Court has not resolved this is-
stored, an inmate is eligible for execution. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts.
642, 648 (West Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07 (West Supp. 1993). In
Maryland, however, a death row inmate found to be incompetent for execution
has his sentence changed to life imprisonment. The Maryland statute
provides:
If the court finds the inmate to be incompetent it shall revoke the
warrant to execute the death sentence and remand the case to the
court in which the sentence of death was imposed, which shall strike
the sentence of death and enter in its place a sentence of life impris-
onment without the possibility of parole. The sentence shall be
mandatory and may not be suspended, in whole or in part.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 75A(d)(3) (1992).
37. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 425 (1986) (Powell, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment). According to Justice Powell, "the
only question raised is not whether, but when, his execution may take place."
Id. He concluded: "My point is only that if petitioner is cured of his disease,
the State is free to execute him." I& at 425 n.5.
38. See Horton, supra note 11, at 1192-94, 1224.
39. See, e.g., In re Emergency Amendment to Fla. Rules, 497 So. 2d 643,
644 (Fla. 1986) (per curiam) (stating that competence is not affected by medi-
cation). Present Florida law omits any reference to chemical competence. See
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07 (West Supp. 1993); see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 75A(a)(2)(ii) (1992) ("An inmate is not incompetent merely because his or
her competence is dependent upon continuing treatment, including the use of
medication.").
40. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 75A(a)(2)(ii) (1992). Under this legislation,
competence must be established prior to the competence-for-execution hear-
ing, however, because an inmate found incompetent in Maryland automatically
has his sentence commuted to life imprisonment. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 75A(d)(3). Thus, an inmate on medication at the time of the hearing is eligi-
ble for execution, but an inmate may not be placed on medication in order to
restore competence once his incompetence has been established.
41. Some states will not try a defendant suffering from adverse effects of
medication that alter the defendant's courtroom demeanor. See Common-
wealth v. Louraine, 453 N.E.2d 437, 442 (Mass. 1983); In re Pray, 336 A.2d 174,
177 (Vt. 1975). Other states may forcibly medicate defendants to render them
competent for trial. See Khiem v. United States, 612 A.2d 160, 168-69 (D.C.
1993] 1201
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sue directly, but it has ruled that in certain circumstances the
state may forciby medicate a defendant to restore competence
for trial. Thus, implicitly, the Court has accepted the view that
competence dependent upon antipsychotic medication suffices
for the purpose of standing trial.42
Those who support the execution of chemically-competent
inmates argue that because such competence is sufficient for
trial in many jurisdictions, it is adequate for execution as well.
That the Supreme Court has permitted chemical competence
for trial does not mean, however, that it necessarily suffices for
execution. Although the standards for determining compe-
tence to stand trial and competence for execution are the same
or similar, the underlying rationales considerably differ.
Establishing competence to stand trial ensures the defend-
ant's right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.43 The possibility of an
unnatural courtroom demeanor poses a significant problem for
a defendant under the influence of mind-altering drugs.44 Also,
drugs may adversely affect the defendant's ability to assist her
lawyer in preparing a defense.45 Although some courts accept
the view that expert testimony explaining the effects of medi-
cation on the defendant's cognition and demeanor resolves any
unfairness at trial,46 other courts assert that no amount of ex-
1992), cert. denied, 1992 WL 347102 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1993); Riggins v. Nevada, 112
S. Ct. 1810, 1814-15 (1992) (reversing forcible medication order because State
had not shown lack of alternative means to render defendant competent for
trial, not because forcible medication to restore competence for trial is per se
invalid). See generally RONALD ROESCH & STEPHAN L. GOLDING, COMPE-
TENCY TO STAND TRIAL 39-43 (1980) (commenting on legal and ethical con-
cerns involved in use of medication to achieve competency).
42. See Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815.
43. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180-83 (1975). The Court stated:
It has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is
such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of
the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in
preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial. ... [The prohi-
bition is fundamental to an adversary system of justice.
Id. at 171-72.
44. ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 41, at 40. Possible side effects from
antipsychotic drugs include lethargy, depression, and anxiety. See Michelle K.
Bachand, Note, Antipsychotic Drugs and the Incompetent Defendant A Per-
spective on the Treatment and Prosecution of Incompetent Defendants, 47
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1059, 1061-63, 1084 (1990) (suggesting that courts should
hold hearings to determine effects of drugs on defendants before proceeding to
trial); see also supra note 5 for a discussion of antipsychotic drugs and their
side effects.
45. See ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 41, at 40.
46. See, e.g., Riggins v. State, 808 P.2d 535, 537 (Nev. 1991) (holding that
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pert testimony can erase the impression a defendant's unnatu-
ral demeanor makes on a jury.47 Notably, Louisiana is among
the majority of death-penalty jurisdictions48 allowing a chemi-
cally-competent defendant to stand trial.49
ample testimony on effects substituted for demeanor when alternative was no
trial), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1814-
15 (1992); State v. Hayes, 389 A.2d 1379, 1382 (N.H. 1978) (stating that chemi-
cally-competent defendant may be tried if jury is notified about effects of
psychotropic drugs and, upon defendant's request, views defendant in unmedi-
cated state similar to his state at time of alleged crime); State v. Jojola, 553
P.2d 1296, 1300 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976) (finding defendant had opportunity to of-
fer expert testimony that would have resolved demeanor problems).
47. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Louraine, 453 N.E.2d 437, 442 (Mass. 1983)
(stating that expert testimony on effects of drugs cannot substitute for natural
demeanor because jury may discount the testimony and judge defendant on
the basis of what they witness as his demeanor); In re Pray, 336 A.2d 174, 177
(Vt. 1975) (because of due process concerns court should not try defendant suf-
fering from adverse side effects of drugs). The American Bar Association
would allow chemically-competent defendants to stand trial unless the adverse
effects of the medication on the defendant prevent a full and fair hearing.
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, standard 7-4.14 (1989).
Part (a) of the standard reads: "A defendant should not be considered incom-
petent to stand trial because the defendant's present mental competence is de-
pendent upon continuation of treatment or habilitation which includes
medication .... ." Id. Part (b) ensures the defendant an opportunity to present
evidence as to the effects of drugs on her demeanor. Id.
48. Twenty-six of the 36 penalty states have decided to try medicated de-
fendants. See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.38(A) (Anderson Supp. 1991); FLA.
R. CR1M. 3.215(c); Bender v. State, 455 So. 2d 273, 275 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984);
State v. Berger, 828 P.2d 1258, 1260 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); People v. Danielson,
838 P.2d 729, 750 (Cal. 1992) (en banc); State v. Gonzalez, 535 A.2d 345, 353-54
(Conn. 1987); Goodwin v. State, 419 S.E.2d 39, 41 (Ga. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
1992 Ga. LEXIS 568 (Ga. 1992); State v. Hampton, 218 So. 2d 311, 312-13 (La.
1969); Turpin v. State, 750 S.W.2d 720, 721 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Moore,
350 N.W.2d 14, 16-17 (Neb. 1984); Higgins v. State, 808 P.2d 535, 537-38 (Nev.
1991), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1814-
15 (1992); State v. Hayes, 389 A.2d 1379, 1381 (N.H. 1978); State v. Otero, 570
A.2d 503, 506 (N.J. 1989); State v. Jojola, 553 P.2d 1296, 1299-1300 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1976); State v. Ellis, 185 S.E.2d 40, 42 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971); Ake v. State,
778 P.2d 460, 465-66 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989); State v. King, 733 P.2d 472, 478-79
(Or. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 737 P.2d 1248 (Or. 1987); Commonwealth v.
Hughes, 555 A.2d 1264, 1271 (Pa. 1989); State v. Law, 244 S.E.2d 302, 306-07
(S.C. 1978); State v. Whitney, 486 N.W.2d 269, 270 (S.D. 1992); State v. Stacy,
556 S.W.2d 552, 557 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977); Atomanczyk v. State, 776 S.W.2d
297, 304 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); State v. Butcher, 648
P.2d 1391, 1392 (Utah 1982) (per curiam); State v. Lover, 707 P.2d 1351, 1353-54
(Wash. Ct. App. 1985). The remaining 10 death penalty states (Arkansas, Colo-
rado, Delaware, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, Virginia,
Wyoming) have not yet dealt with the issue. Search of LEXIS: States library,
Omni file (search: (competenc! or incompetence w/15 trial) w/35 psychotropic
or antipsychotic or medicat!) (March 23, 1993).
49. Hampton, 218 So. 2d at 312-13.
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In contrast, requiring competence for execution ensures
that the insane are not executed in violation of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment.50 The primary concern regarding chemical competence
for execution is whether a chemically-competent inmate has
truly been restored to competence. The Supreme Court's capi-
tal punishment jurisprudence requires a higher standard of re-
liability for all determinations essential to capital cases as
compared to other cases.5 1 The temporary nature of chemical
competence renders difficult a reliable assessment of the suffi-
ciency of an inmate's competence for execution.
5 2
D. WASHINGTON V. HARPER: THE POSSIBILITY OF FORCIBLY
AEDICATING AN INMATE
The issue of whether chemical competence ever suffices for
execution is distinct from the question of whether the state can
forcibly medicate inmates at all. In Washington v. Harper, the
Supreme Court declared that, in certain circumstances, the for-
cible medication of inmates does not violate the Constitution.
53
The Court held that the state could forcibly medicate a men-
tally-ill inmate with antipsychotic drugs if the inmate is "dan-
gerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate's
50. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406-08 (1986).
51. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in the re-
sult). Justice Harlan stated: "So far as capital cases are concerned, I think
they stand on quite a different footing than other offenses. In such cases the
law is especially sensitive to demands for that procedural fairness which in-
heres in a civilian trial." Id The Court has also asserted that "[d]eath, in its
finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term dif-
fers from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference,
there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determina-
tion that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case." Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court ex-
plained that "[w]hen a defendant's life is at stake, the Court has been particu-
larly sensitive to insure that every safeguard is observed." 428 U.S. 153, 187
(1976) (citing Reid, 354 U.S. at 77 (Harlan, J., concurring in result)).
52. The Louisiana Supreme Court was the first court to deal directly with
the question of medicating a death row inmate for the purpose of restoring
competency for execution. See Horton, supra note 11, at 1192. The issue has
arisen in Florida as well, where a chemically-competent inmate presently sits
on death row. Id. Still, neither the Florida court nor the Louisiana court ad-
dressed the chemical-competency issue directly. See State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d
746 (La. 1992); see supra note 11 (discussing Florida case). Moreover, since an
estimated 70% of all death row inmates suffer from some form of deteriora-
tion, JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 50, the problem of chemically-induced compe-
tence is likely to resurface until it is resolved.
53. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990).
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medical interest."54 The Court reasoned: "[IThe proper stan-
dard for determining the validity of a prison regulation claimed
to infringe on an inmate's constitutional rights is to ask
whether the regulation is 'reasonably related to legitimate pe-
nological interests.' "55 Thus, the Court determined that prison
safety was a legitimate state interest and that forcible medica-
tion of a dangerous prisoner was reasonably related to that
interest.56
Prior to Harper, many courts approved of forcible medica-
tion to restore competence for trial,57 and Harper has not yet
changed these courts' views.58 Until Michael Owen Perry's
case reached the Louisiana courts, however, no court had con-
fronted the possibility of extending the reasoning in its compe-
tence for trial cases to allow forcible medication to restore
competence for execution.5 9
54. Id.
55. Id- at 223 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). It is not
yet clear whether the courts will interpret Harper as broadly as this statement
implies or whether they will limit Harper to prison safety cases.
56. Id. at 225-27. The Court explained:
The State has undertaken the obligation to provide prisoners with
medical treatment consistent not only with their own medical inter-
ests, but also with the needs of the institution. Prison administrators
have not only an interest in ensuring the safety of prison staffs ...
but the duty to take reasonable measures for the prisoners' own
safety.
Id at 225.
57. See United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1988) (en
banc) (holding that, when following proper procedure, court may compel forci-
ble medication of defendant), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990); State v. Otero,
570 A.2d 503, 507 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989) (holding court can order de-
fendant to take antipsychotic medication to achieve sufficient competency to
stand trial); State v. Law, 244 S.E.2d 302, 307 (S.C. 1978) (medication may be
administered without consent of defendant where necessary to render defend-
ant competent to stand trial).
58. See, e.g., Khiem v. United States, 612 A.2d 160, 162 (D.C. 1992) (forci-
ble medication allowed to restore competence for trial), cert denied, No. 92-
6587, 1992 WL 347102 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1993); Riggins v. State, 808 P.2d 535, 538
(Nev. 1991) (compelling defendant to take antipsychotic drugs for purpose of
restoring competency for trial), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Riggins v.
Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1814-15 (1992). Notwithstanding these decisions, other
courts have recognized a liberty interest in refusing medication that can not be
violated without compelling justification. See Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387,
1394 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding pretrial detainee retains a liberty interest in
avoiding unwanted medication with antipsychotic drugs), cert denied, 469 U.S.
1214 (1985); Large v. Superior Court, 714 P.2d 399, 407-08 (Az. 1986) (en banc)
(holding that, absent emergency, general security of prison does not justify
forcibly medicating incompetent defendants).
59. See Horton, supra note 11, at 1224.
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II. STATE v. PERRY: LOUISIANA FLIRTS WITH
FORCIBLE MEDICATION AND CHEMICAL
COMPETENCE
Michael Owen Perry was incompetent for the purpose of
execution 60 under the Louisiana competence standard61 and the
standard set forth in Ford v. Wainwright.62 The trial court de-
termined, however, that antipsychotic medication could restore
Perry's competence and ordered that such medication be ad-
ministered, forcibly if necessary.63 The Supreme Court of Loui-
siana denied review 4 and Perry appealed to the United States
Supreme Court.65 On appeal, the Court vacated the medication
order and remanded to the trial court for reconsideration in
light of Harper.66 On remand, the trial court reinstated its
original order, reasoning that Harper was inapplicable because
it did not involve capital punishment proceedings. 6 7
In State v. Perry, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed
the trial court's order, holding that the state could not forcibly
medicate a death-row inmate for the primary purpose of restor-
ing competence for execution.68 The Perry court determined
60. State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 750 (La. 1992).
61. State v. Allen, 15 So. 2d 870, 871 (La. 1943). The Louisiana compe-
tence standard for execution requires that the defendant has the capacity "to
understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense." Id.
62. 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment). Like the Louisiana standard, Justice Powell's standard in
Ford requires that the defendant understand the nature of execution and why
he is facing it. See supra text accompanying note 31 for further discussion of
Justice Powell's standard.
63. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 773 (Marcus, J., dissenting). For the text of Judge
Hymel's order, see supra note 6.
64. Id. at 748.
65. Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990) (per curiam).
66. Id. There has been speculation as to why the Court remanded for con-
sideration in light of Harper because Harper had already been decided when
the Court granted certiorari for Perry. Indeed, Perry's attorney argued that
Harper precluded forcible medication for the sole purpose of restoring compe-
tence for execution. Brief for Petitioner at 44, Perry v. Louisiana, 494 U.S. 210
(1990) (No. 89-5120). One critic suggests that the Court was deadlocked over
the issue because Justice Souter was not yet sitting on the court. Linda
Greenhouse, New Hearing on Forced Medication of Inmate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
14, 1990, at A30. A 4-4 decision would have affirmed the death sentence. Id
67. See Perry, 610 So. 2d at 748.
68. Id. at 771. Two justices dissented, each of whom disagreed with the
majority's interpretation of Harper and the state constitution. Justice Marcus
argued that Harper should be applied to determine whether the state's plan to
medicate Perry is reasonably related to its penological interest. Id. at 776
(Marcus, J., dissenting). He disagreed with the majority's interpretation of
Harper as a prison safety case and would have applied it generally to all legiti-
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that, unlike the forcible medication in Harper, Louisiana's med-
icate-to-execute plan neither improved prison safety nor served
Perry's medical interest.69 The Louisiana Supreme Court based
its decision, however, on the state constitution,70 specifically the
privacy and personhood clause71 and the cruel, excessive, or un-
usual punishment clause.72
The supreme court held that the medicate-to-execute plan
violated the privacy and personhood clause because Perry had a
significant liberty interest in "chart[ing] his ... own medical
treatment plan."73 The court found that interest especially im-
portant because the medication being forced upon Perry often
causes serious side effects.74 The court applied a compelling
state interest test and determined that the state's interest in
carrying out the death penalty did not justify the intrusion of
medication into Perry's mind and body.75
mate penological interests. Id- He concluded that Harper allows the state to
forcibly medicate Perry in order to further its penological interest in carrying
out its criminal sentence. I& Justice Cole argued that the majority erred in
deciding that the medication was not in Perry's best medical interest. Id- at
778 (Cole, J., dissenting). Justice Cole disagreed with the majority's opinion
that forcible medication violated the state constitution. Id- He parsed the ma-
jority's holding and demonstrated its limitations, illustrating that if Perry had
been medicated for a "more legitimate" purpose, his execution would be al-
lowed under the court's holding and reasoning. Id- at 781-82.
69. Id- at 751.
70. Id. at 755. In his dissent, Justice Cole accused the Louisiana court of
avoiding application of Harper and federal jurisprudence in order to escape
further review by the U.S. Supreme Court. I&. at 778 n.1 (Cole, J., dissenting).
71. LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 provides:
Right to Privacy. Every person shall be secure in his person, prop-
erty, communications, houses, papers, and effects against unreasona-
ble searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy. No warrant shall issue
without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, the persons or things to be
seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for the search. Any person
adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of this
Section shall have standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate
court.
72. LA. CONST. art. I., § 20 provides:
Right to Humane Treatment. No law shall subject any person to eu-
thanasia, to torture, or to cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment.
Full rights of citizenship shall be restored upon termination of state
and federal supervision following conviction for any offense.
73. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 756.
74. Id- at 759. The court noted that the drugs regularly produce muscle
and nerve disfunction as well as lethargy, apathy, faintness, blurred vision, in-
somnia, anxiety, impaired liver function, diarrhea, nausea, and irregular pulse
or blood pressure. Id.; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text for a more
detailed description of the side-effects of antipsychotic medication.
75. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 760-61.
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The court further held that forced medication violated the
Louisiana Constitution's cruel and unusual punishment clause
because it was degrading to Perry's dignity as a human being,76
arbitrary in that such treatment was without general applica-
tion,77 excessive because it did not contribute to the deterrence
or retribution purposes of capital punishment,78 and generally
unacceptable to contemporary society.79 Thus, the court con-
cluded that the state could not forcibly medicate Perry solely to
restore him to competence for execution.80
76. Id. at 766. The court declared:
The punishment intended for Perry is severely degrading to human
dignity. It will involve far more than the mere extinguishment of
human life.... [He will be forced to linger for a protracted period,
stripped of the vestiges of humanity and dignity usually reserved to
death row inmates, with the growing awareness that the state is con-
verting his own mind and body into a vehicle for his execution.
Id.
77. Id. The court further stated: "The punishment is anomalous, irregu-
lar and without general application.... Under these circumstances there will
be increased danger of arbitrariness and capriciousness in both the forcible ad-
ministration of drugs and the determination of competence for execution." I&
78. Id. at 766-67. In reference to the lack of deterrent effect, the court
reasoned that it is unlikely that "a capital offender, capable of the kind of cost-
benefit analysis that would make him susceptible to being deterred by the pos-
sibility of execution, would attach crucial weight to the fact that he cannot be
executed should he become insane after being apprehended, convicted and
sentenced to death." IM In reference to the lack of retributive value of forci-
bly medicating an insane death-row inmate to achieve competence, the court
pointed to the lack of proportionality between the crime and the punishment
and stated: "Rather than calling upon Perry to suffer only the extinguish-
ment of his life in a humane manner, the state would have him undergo a
course of maltreatment that is inherently loathsome and degrading to his dig-
nity as a human being." Id. at 768.
In contrast, Justice Cole argued in his dissent that Perry's execution
served both deterrence and retribution. Id. at 780-81 (Cole, J., dissenting). He
asserted that if Perry were not executed, the number of death-row inmates
who claim insanity would increase dramatically. Id. at 780. Furthermore, he
argued: "In this case, the punishment, execution by lethal injection, is indeed
disproportionate to the crime. It is disproportionately low." Id- at 781.
79. Id. at 768.
80. Id. at 771. The court held:
The trial court's order authorizing and requiring the state to adminis-
ter antipsychotic drugs to Perry against his will for purposes of execu-
tion is reversed. The execution of the death sentence upon Perry is
stayed. In order to modify this stay order the state must demonstrate
to this court that Perry has achieved or regained his sanity and com-
petence for execution independently of the effects or influence of an-
tipsychotic drugs.
Id. (emphasis added). The last sentence of the above quoted passage consti-
tutes the first and only time that court mentioned chemical competence for
execution. Justice Cole's dissent demonstrates that this sentence is not gen-
eral law, but a specific order which rid the court of Perry's case. Id. at 782
1208 Vol. 77:1193
1993] ~CURE TO KILL 10
III. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF STATE v. PERRY AND THE
RESULTING DILEMMA FOR INSANE DEATH-
ROW INMATES ACROSS THE
COUNTRY
State v. Perry presented the Louisiana Supreme Court with
two issues: whether the state may forcibly medicate a death-
row inmate under Harper v. Washington and whether chemical
competence is sufficient for the purpose of execution.8' The
Perry court resolved the first issue under state law rather than
Harper and only considered whether the state could forcibly
medicate an inmate solely to achieve competence for execu-
tion.8 2 The court dodged the second issue entirely, failing to
exclude the possibility of executing a chemically-competent in-
mate. Consequently, while the court's result may relieve many
people across the country,83 the decision's shortcomings may
render such relief premature.8 4
A. THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT FAILED TO RESOLVE THE
ISSUE OF FORCIBLE MEDICATION UNDER HARPER
The Perry court's holding that the state may not forcibly
medicate an inmate is limited to cases in which the state admits
its purpose in medicating the inmate is to render her sane
enough to be executed. As Harper v. Washington demon-
strates, however, a state might forcibly medicate an inmate in
many other circumstances. For example, the state may claim
an interest in protecting the insane inmate from harming her-
self or other inmates, as it did in Harper.85 Additionally, not
(Cole, J., dissenting). He interpreted Perry's holding as relating only to the
forcible medication order. Id.
81. Id. at 749. The trial court's holdings were twofold: it declared chemi-
cal competence sufficient and forcible medication appropriate. For the text of
Judge Hymel's order, see supra note 6.
82. 610 So. 2d at 752-55. The court determined that Harper required the
state to prove that forcing medication furthered the goal of prison safety and
the prisoner's medical interest. Id. at 753. While Harper was a prison safety
case, the Harper Court, under its reasonableness test, did not delineate prison
safety as the only possible interest which could justify forcible medication.
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224-27 (1990).
83. Michael Owen Perry's battle has been followed by scholars and the
media across the country. See, e.g., Mark Hansen, Insane Inmate Avoids Death
Penalty, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 32; Adam Nossiter, Paradox: Healing to Exe-
cute, ATLANTA CONST., Mar. 17, 1991, at Al.
84. Because the case was the first of its kind, other courts will look to it
when confronted with the same issue. Unfortunately, the decision will not aid
these courts with respect to the core issues involved.
85. Harper, 494 U.S. at 223.
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all inmates refuse medication. In fact, Perry accepted medica-
tion to treat his illness prior to the competency hearing 86 The
trial court also found that Perry presented a potential danger
to himself and others.87
By restricting Harper to its facts, the Louisiana Supreme
Court avoided applying it in Perry. The Perry court distin-
guished the case before it from Harper on the ground that
Harper constituted a prison safety case while Perry was a death
penalty case.88 The lesson of Harper, however, is that a state
may forcibly medicate a prisoner if it has a penological interest
in doing so and if the medication serves the prisoner's medical
interest.8 9 Under this more general interpretation of Harper,
which the language of the decision supports,90 it is not clear
that the two cases are so easily distinguishable.
A broad reading of Harper would require the state to prove
a penological interest in forcibly medicating an inmate. Ac-
cordingly, the state's argument in Perry rested on the notion
that its interest in punishing convicts outweighed Perry's right
to refuse treatment.91 To embrace the state's argument, the
supreme court would have to conclude that forcible medication
reasonably relates to the state's interest in sentence enforce-
ment. The dissenters in Perry clearly thought this was the
case.
92
Furthermore, Harper requires the state to prove that the
prisoner's best medical interest requires medication. 93 At first
glance, it seems a far stretch of the imagination to believe that
86. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 746, 748 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 774. The Louisiana Supreme Court ignored this finding. Id.
88. Id. at 754.
89. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 222-23.
90. See id. at 222-23 ("Medication... will be ordered only if it is in the
prisoner's medical interests" and if it is "reasonably related to legitimate peno-
logical interests.").
91. Brief for Respondent at 1, Perry v. Louisiana, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (No.
89-5120). The State argued that "a death row inmate's interest in being free
from a medication... was extinguished upon the imposition of a sentence of
death," contending that "the medication of Perry is a necessary concomitant to
carrying out his sentence of death" and emphasizing that "the State has an
overriding interest to ensure that his death sentence is implemented." Id. at
10-12.
92. See Perry, 610 So. 2d at 776 (Marcus, J., dissenting) ("Clearly, the state
possesses a significant interest in the enforcement of its criminal laws .... I
would conclude that.., the forcible medication of Perry is reasonably related
to a legitimate penological interest."); id. at 780-81 (Cole, J., dissenting) (forci-
ble medication to allow execution is warranted for such hideous crimes).
93. 494 U.S. at 227.
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medicating someone for the express purpose of restoring com-
petence for execution serves the prisoner's best medical inter-
est. Arguably, however, Perry's medical history showed that
the doctors had Perry's best medical interest in mind when
they treated him with antipsychotic drugs.94 The doctors who
examined Perry during the competency hearings recommended
the antipsychotic drugs for his medical treatment. 95 The medi-
cation alleviated the symptoms of his mental illness and aided
his thinking process. 9 6 Including drugs in Perry's treatment
program to restore his competence indicates that they benefit-
ted his mental health.
Rather than risk Supreme Court reversal,97 however, the
Louisiana Supreme Court avoided applying Harper and instead
decided the case under the Louisiana Constitution.98 Arguably,
a state may forcibly medicate a death-row inmate under Harper
if such medication is reasonably related to the state's interest in
punishing convicts and the treatment serves the mentally-ill in-
mate's health. Thus, if the Perry court had applied Harper as
the two dissenters urged and recognized a legitimate penologi-
cal interest in the execution, it would have confronted the more
basic question of whether a medicated inmate is competent for
execution. Because the court did not apply Harper in this man-
ner, the chemical competence issue remains unresolved in Lou-
isiana and other death penalty states.
B. THE UNRESOLVED QUESTION OF THE SUFFICIENCY OF
CHEMICAL COMPETENCE FOR EXECUTION
The Louisiana Supreme Court failed to address the trial
court's declaration that chemically-produced competence suf-
fices for the purpose of execution. Because Perry still refuses
to take the antipsychotic medication,99 and because the state
cannot forcibly medicate him, he will not face execution. The
court's failure, however, forces inmates like Perry to choose be-
tween refusing medical treatment to avoid execution or treat-
ing the symptoms of the mental illness and risking execution.
Instead of death, the inmate endures a life sentence of suffering
from the symptoms of his mental illness. A mentally-ill in-
94. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 772-73 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
95. I&
96. Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 5, at 79.
97. In his dissent, Justice Cole accused the court of avoiding Harper to es-
cape Supreme Court review. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 778 n.1 (Cole, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 750-55.
99. Id. at 749.
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mate's decision to accept or refuse treatment should be based
on his medical need, not on the state's desire to execute.
In effect, the Perry court hinged the determination of
whether an inmate will be executed on the method by which
competence is purportedly achieved, rather than on whether it
has actually been realized. For the purpose of determining
competence for execution, no basis exists for distinguishing be-
tween inmates whom the state has forcibly medicated to re-
store competence and inmates whom the state has forcibly
treated for other purposes or who voluntarily accepted medica-
tion. The real issue is whether an inmate on antipsychotic
drugs is competent for execution.100
Had the Perry court addressed the sufficiency of chemical
competence issue, it may have declared such competence ade-
quate for the purpose of execution given its precedent of al-
lowing chemically-competent defendants to stand trial. In the
context of capacity to stand trial, the Louisiana Supreme Court
declared: "That this condition has resulted from the use of a
prescribed tranquilizing medication is of no legal conse-
quence.... [T]he court looks to the condition only. It does not
look beyond existing competency and erase improvement pro-
duced by medical science."''1 1 Louisiana follows the majority of
death-penalty jurisdictions that try chemically-competent de-
fendants.10 2 Moreover, these jurisdictions employ the same or
very similar standards to determine mental capacity for both
trial and execution. 03 Because the court in Perry failed to ex-
100. Indeed, the State made this argument on appeal, contending that
chemical competence equals competence for purposes of execution. Brief for
Respondent at 1, Perry v. Louisiana, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (No. 89-5120). The
State maintained that "the resolution of this issue may very well affect the
State of Louisiana's right to demand retribution[.]" Id. Furthermore, the
State argued: "The antipsychotic medication assures the mentally ill con-
demned inmate that he has sufficient mental capacity to understand that he is
being executed for the crimes he committed.... [T]he medication achieves and
maintains competency so that the execution may lawfully take place." Id-
101. State v. Hampton, 218 So. 2d 311, 312 (La. 1969).
102. Twenty-six of the 36 death penalty states try chemically-competent
defendants. For a list of cases and statutes, see supra note 48.
103. In Louisiana, the standards are identical. State v. Allen, 15 So. 2d 870,
871 (La. 1943). Other jurisdictions apply the standard of Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986), to determine competence for execution and the simi-
lar standard of Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam), to
determine capacity to stand trial. Compare, e.g., Rector v. Clinton, 823 S.W.2d
829, 831 (Ark. 1990) (per curiam) (applying Ford standard) with Stover v.
Hamilton, 604 S.W.2d 934, 939 (Ark. 1980) (applying Dusky standard). For the




amine the sufficiency of chemical competence, these courts may
extend their policy of trying chemically-competent defendants
to executing insane death-row inmates treated with antip-
sychotic medication.
C. Two ROUTES TO RESOLVING THE CHEMICAL COMPETENCE
ISSUE
Executing a chemically-competent death-row inmate may
seem to be the logical step in jurisdictions which already allow
defendants treated with antipsychotic drugs to stand trial and
view competence for trial similarly or the same as competence
for execution. The competence of an insane inmate treated
with antipsychotic medication is, however, temporary and un-
predictable.10 4 As a result, the execution of such an inmate vio-
lates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. Two possible strategies can avoid this result:
either declare drug-based competence insufficient to stand trial
or demonstrate that the standard of competence required for
trial is not identical to that required for execution.
If courts accept that drug-based competence is insufficient
to stand trial, by analogy it is insufficient for execution. In sup-
port of this proposition, some courts assert that chemical com-
petence to stand trial does not suffice to guarantee a fair
trial.10 5 These courts have held it unfair to subject a defendant
to a trial in which his demeanor is unnaturally modified and his
ability to assist his attorney in his defense is limited.1 0 6
In contrast, some commentators maintain that drugs affect
individuals differently. Thus a complete ban on the trial of the
chemically-competent results in too broad of a rule. Rather,
courts should evaluate the effects of the drugs on an individual
basis to ensure a medicated inmate who would receive a fair
trial could not unjustly avoid trial.10 7 Courts that support
chemical competence for trial further state that expert testi-
mony on the effects of the drugs can overcome any amount of
prejudice and that courts can monitor fairness through the ap-
104. Bachand, supra note 44, at 1061.
105. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Louraine, 453 N.E.2d 437, 442 (Mass. 1983);
In re Pray, 336 A.2d 174, 177 (Vt. 1975).
106. E.g., Louraine, 453 N.E.2d at 442.
107. ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 41, at 41-43; Winick, Psychotropic
Medication and Competence to Stand Trial, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 769,
792, 814-816 (1977) (advocating abandonment of the automatic bar to trial of
chemically-competent defendants, which can be "strategically beneficial" for




The second, more viable strategy is to distinguish between
competence for trial and competence for execution. While
drug-based competence may suffice for the purpose of standing
trial, it is not sufficient in the context of capital punishment.
This solution takes account of the different purposes, concerns,
and stakes underlying each competence determination.
The purpose of requiring competence for trial is to ensure
that each defendant receives a full and fair trial,109 whereas re-
quiring competence for execution, as explained in Ford, serves
to avoid executing an insane inmate in violation of the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.110
Because the Supreme Court requires a higher degree of relia-
bility in capital cases, 1 ' the question of the sufficiency of chem-
ical competence for execution raises concerns regarding the
predictability and accuracy of chemical competence. Questions
arise as to how long the medicated inmate's competence will
last and whether competence has actually been achieved. Be-
cause medication does not cure mental illness but only masks
its symptoms, it is difficult to assess whether the competence is
real.112 Furthermore, higher stakes exist in answering these
questions in the capital context. If an error occurs in determin-
ing mental capacity for trial, the defendant may appeal the con-
viction. An error in determining competence for execution is
final.
The distinct rationales behind each competence standard
prevent the application of one from logically extending to the
other. While Louisiana and other courts allow trial of those de-
fendants who are merely chemically-competent, it should not
extend this policy to allow execution of chemically-competent
death-row inmates.
108. See Riggins v. State, 808 P.2d 535, 536 (Nev. 1991), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1814-15 (1992); State v.
Hayes, 389 A.2d 1379, 1381-82 (N.H. 1978); State v. Jojola, 553 P.2d 1296, 1300
(N.M. Ct. App. 1976).
109. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (requir-
ing competence so that a defendant may consult with a lawyer and have a ra-
tional understanding of the proceedings). See supra note 33 and
accompanying text for further discussion of the degree of competence required
for trial.
110. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406-08 (1986).
111. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187-88 (1976); Woodson v. North Caro-
lina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 (1956) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in result).
112. Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 5, at 101.
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D. COURTS SHOULD BAR THE EXECUTION OF CHEMICALLY-
COMPETENT INMATES
The Perry court emphasized the issue of forcible medica-
tion and concluded that the state could not forcibly medicate an
inmate solely to restore competence for execution.'13 Whether
an inmate voluntarily chooses medication or forcibly receives
medication, however, should not determine whether she will be
executed. Rather, the sufficiency of her competence should de-
termine the issue. Chemical competence is not sufficient for
the purpose of execution, whether it is forcibly or voluntarily
induced.
Michael Owen Perry suffers from a severe schizo-affective
disorder,114 rendering him incompetent for execution under the
standard enunciated in Ford."z5 His condition is incurable."1
6
The antipsychotic drugs the trial court ordered merely mask
the symptoms of his illness so that he achieves a semblance of
competence.117 In fact, even on the medication, Perry does not
always appear competent." 8 One of the doctors who regularly
treats Perry testified at the competency hearing: "I don't think
I've seen Michael, even on medication, be completely coherent,
well-integrated, rational."" 9 The same doctor described him as
a "moving target," explaining that it is impossible to predict
when the medication will enable him to be coherent or for how
long. 2 0
Because of its unreliability, chemically-induced competence
does not satisfy Justice Powell's test requiring that a death-row
inmate understand his punishment when he is executed.12' If
an inmate can understand his punishment through the adminis-
tration of drugs, at that moment he may be competent. Drug-
113. See State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 771 (La. 1992).
114. Id. at 748.
115. Cf Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986) (Powell, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment).
116. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 748. Even on the medication, Perry is mentally ill.
I&.
117. Id.; see also Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 5, at 10.
118. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 749.
119. Brief for Petitioner at 20, Perry v. Louisiana, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (No.
89-5120) (quoting Dr. Cox at April 1988 hearing).
120. Id- at 17. Dr. Cox explained at an April 1988 hearing that "I have seen
him on and off medication several times now and I have seen him respond to
medication.... [H]is competency status tends to change, it's very labile, it
moves about." Id
121. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986) (Powell, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that the defendant must
be aware of his impending death).
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based competence is unreliable, however, because of its tempo-
rary nature. An inmate who claims to understand his punish-
ment when asked by a judge at a competency-hearing may not
understand it ten minutes later or when the execution occurs,
due to time lapse or added stress which may reduce the effects
of the medication. Furthermore, the medication does not affect
the patient in the same way each time a doctor administers
it. 12 2 The state cannot guarantee competence at the moment of
execution. In the midst of this uncertainty, a state that exe-
cutes a chemically-competent inmate risks violating the Ford
bar on execution of the insane. By taking such a risk, the state
arbitrarily and capriciously inflicts punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.123
Although the Supreme Court did not address the issue of
temporary competence in Ford, when viewed in light of capital
punishment jurisprudence as a whole, temporary competence is
clearly insufficient. Because of the obvious finality of the death
penalty, the Supreme Court requires a higher degree of relia-
bility and certainty in capital proceedings than in others.124
The determination of whether an otherwise incompetent in-
mate will achieve competence through medication and will re-
tain that competence at the time of execution simply cannot
meet the requisite degree of reliability. If the state is uncertain
whether the person it plans to execute understands the nature
of his punishment, the execution does not serve retributive or
deterrent purposes and thus constitutes cruel and unusual pun-
ishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.us
CONCLUSION
The Louisiana Supreme Court did not address adequately
the issues presented in State v. Perry. As a result, it left open
122. Bachand, supra note 44, at 1061. In fact, doctors who examined Perry
testified that he reacted inconsistently to the medication. Brief for Petitioner
at 20, Perry (No 89-5120).
123. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (per curiam) (overrul-
ing a system that had no standardized procedure for determining whom to se-
lect for the death penalty).
124. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187-88 (1976); Woodson v. North Caro-
lina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
125. The death penalty must not be applied arbitrarily or capriciously, and
its application must also serve the purposes of deterrence and retribution. See
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188-89 (noting that a capital sentencing body's discretion
must be limited to minimize the risk of "arbitrary and capricious" action); see




the question of whether chemical competence is sufficient for
the purpose of execution. This Comment proposes that compe-
tence dependent upon antipsychotic drugs never suffices for
purposes of execution. Execution of the chemically-competent
violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the
Eighth Amendment: because of the unreliability and tempo-
rary nature of the inmate's competence, the execution serves
neither a retributive nor a deterrent purpose. The Louisiana
Supreme Court's failure to address the sufficiency issue forces
Louisiana death-row inmates, and potentially hundreds of
others across the country, s2 6 to choose between a life sentence
of untreated insanity and execution.
126. As of the spring of 1992, 2588 inmates sat on death-row. BUREAU OF
JusTICE STATISTICS, supra note 12, at 703.
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